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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I investigate possible constraints in the European legal order on the use of  
drone operations in extraterritorial situations. This includes an analysis of  the EU law on 
competences in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the case law of  the 
European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR). 
The analysis of  EU law is focused on the competences of  the European Parliament to 
constrain the actions of  the EU under the CFSP as well as the role of  the CFSP as a 
decisive factor in security and capability developments. The second part of  the analysis 
focus on the case law of  the ECtHR on extraterritorial applicability of  the European 
Convention on Human Rights. I investigate whether there exist a legal basis in the 
jurisprudence of  the Court to argue that the application of  drone technology will itself  
trigger a jurisdictional link, thereby constraining what constitutes legal operations with 
drones in extraterritorial situations. 
I conclude that the intergovernmental paradigm of  the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy denies the European Parliament a decisive role in the development of  a constraining 
policy on the use of  drones, but that the area of  the CFSP plays a role in conflict 
prevention and -solution, and that drone capabilities will likely become a factor in the 
coming decades. In the second part of  the analysis I argue that there exist no basis in the 
case law of  the ECtHR that drone operations will trigger extraterritorial obligations of  
States, in and by itself. This emanates mainly from the ECtHR’s restrictive interpretation of  
jurisdiction as primarily territorial and exercised extraterritorially only in exceptional cases.!
!
!2jmunkw@ruc.dk - EU-B1 - F2014
Constraints on Drone Operations in the European Legal Order
1: INTRODUCTION: A POSSIBLE EUROPEAN 
POSITION ON DRONES 
In a recent article Rosén argues that the use of  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or drones, could 
possibly trigger extraterritorial jurisdiction of  States party to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR).  The argument put forth by Rosén is that drone technology, by its 1
constant surveillance, target acquisition and instant weapon delivery constitutes an exercise 
of  control and authority, which allegedly triggers state jurisdiction for the purposes of  the 
ECHR outside their own territory. This approach to the conduct of  drone strikes opens 
the legal debate surrounding drones, as it would imply that a strict legal regime would 
constrain the propensity of  conducting drone operations.  Such a triggering of  jurisdiction 2
would imply that the State in question would be compelled to ensure and/or respect the 
rights of  targeted individuals, as they are laid down in the ECHR. It would, inter alia, likely 
include a more strict obligation to ensure that impartial investigations are conducted after 
the fact, or even possibly put restrictions on the use of  lethal force itself  in a drone strike 
following intense surveillance.  3
Even though public debate on drones in Europe have not yet amounted to any salient 
proposals to curb the development or deployment of  drones, there is a political 
momentum towards increased deliberation and restriction of  development and use of  
drones. The European Parliament passed a resolution in February 2014 urging the Member 
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  Rosén, F (2013) Extremely Stealthy and Incredibly Close: Drones, Control and Legal Responsibility, 1
Journal of  Conflict & Security Law 2013: 1-19, OUP; Note that Rosén also consider a 
possible obligation to use drones as a precautionary measure described Humanitarian Law. I 
am not concerned with that particular argument here, but only the first leg of  his article, 
discussing the possible triggering of  ECHR jurisdiction by using drone technology.
  For an overview of  the legal debate surrounding drones: Henriksen, A (2014) Jus ad Bellum 2
and American Targeted Use of  Force to Fight Terrorism Around the World, Journal of  Conflict & 
Security Law; Henriksen, A & Ringsmose, J (2013) Dronerne er Her! Strategiske, Retlige og Etiske 
Konsekvenser, Danish Institute for International Studies, Report 2013:03; Discussions of  the 
legality of  drone strikes, as a means of  killing targeted individuals outside conventional areas 
of  combat, has been ongoing for some time now: for an outline of  the discussion of  
whether to apply International Humanitarian Law or Human Rights Law see Kretzmer, D 
(2005) Targeted Killing of  Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of  
Defence?, The European Journal of  International Law, vol. 16 no. 2; see also Gross, M L 
(2006) Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law Enforcement, Execution or Self-Defence?, Journal of  
Applied Philosophy, vol. 23 no. 3, for a critical approach to either; for an extensive approach 
critical to this discussion, arguing that taken together, IHRL and IHL provide a sufficient 
legal paradigm covering targeted killings, see Melzer, N (2008): Targeted Killing in International 
Law, OUP (esp. concluding chapter and epilogue)
  Rosén, supra note 1 at 11-12. Note that the precise obligations triggered depends on which 3
type of  jurisdiction is triggered; i.e. if  it is the whole set of  rights of  the Convention or only 
those affected by the operation. This will be laid out below in the analysis of  the ECHR case 
law on jurisdiction.
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states, The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,  and in particular 4
the European Council to set out an independent EU position on the use of  armed drones.  5
Thus, a political will towards a European position on drones exists, at least in the 
Parliament, and it seems that it will be one that is quite wary of  the consequences of  this 
new technology on the conduct of  war. My presumption here is that if  there exist a wish to 
constrain the actions of  the US in conducting drone strikes or to curb developments of  a 
European capability, then a solid legal basis for such a critique is imperative. Furthermore, 
as Rosén intimates, if  there should exist constraints within the European legal order on the 
conduct of  drone operations, such constraints would of  course have effects on European 
states, but could also provide a novel interpretation of  human rights regimes in general.  6
In coming years European military involvement around the globe is likely to increase and 
defence cooperation within the EU is likely to include drones.  In addition to the legal 7
consequences for present drone capable nations under the ECHR, an EU stocking drone 
technology will have to take into account any legal consequences that might arise from 
such newly acquired technology, and here the question of  jurisdiction seem highly 
pertinent. As the conflicts in which the EU is presently engaged, such as the Central 
African Republic, are exclusively in unstable regions and not aimed at any government, but 
are executed as supporting operations, the questions of  the use of  drone technology seem 
to be even as pertinent as those posed for US operations in Yemen and Pakistan.  8
I take my cue from Rosén’s argument on drones as possible ‘obligation triggers’ and ask 
whether the current European legal order constrains or enables the application of  drones in extraterritorial 
situations? This question entails an analysis of  EU law on the CFSP, in order to establish the 
possible developments and positions of  different actors within the EU system, as well as 
an analysis of  the ECtHR case law on jurisdiction, set against the technology employed in 
drone operations. 
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  Hereinafter 'the High Representative'4
  European Parliament resolution of  27 February 2014 on the use of  armed drones 5
(2014/2567(RSP))
  Rosén, supra note 1 at 106
  In November 2013, the countries in the European Defence Agency endorsed, inter alia, a 7
roadmap for a European Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, including procurement of  
military drones as a part of  a coming Common Staff  Requirement: European Defence 
Agency (2013) Defence Ministers Commit to Capability Programmes, https://www.eda.europa.eu/
info-hub/news/2013/11/19/defence-ministers-commit-to-capability-programmes 
[Accessed 16 March 2014]
  European External Action Service (2014) Ongoing Missions and Operations, http://8
eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index [Accessed 16 May 2014]
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2: METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
The analysis below will be divided into two main parts. In the first I briefly analyse the 
primary EU law concerning the CFSP. I take as a starting point the treaty provisions on the 
CFSP and its notably intergovernmental nature, in order to discuss the possibilities of  the 
different actors within the EU to propose and partake in the development of  an EU 
position on drones. I furthermore look into recent security developments and strategies of  
the EU in order to establish future demand for drones in the EU. 
The second and most substantial part of  the analysis concerns the possibility of  
jurisdiction being triggered by drone operations. This section is divided into two parts, 
which corresponds to developments in ECtHR case law on state jurisdiction. As Milanovic 
and Conte point out, there has been some inconsistency in establishing extraterritorial 
application of  the ECHR.  9
In the two parts I take as a starting point two seminal cases on extraterritorial jurisdiction: 
Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others  and Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom.  10 11
Banković represent the generally restrictive view of  extraterritorial jurisdiction in the eyes of  
ECtHR as something inherently exceptional and based on territory, thereby excluding any 
personal form of  jurisdiction. It has been criticised heavily for its restrictive interpretation 
but nonetheless sets the stage for how to conceive of  general principles of  extraterritorial 
jurisdiction for the ECHR. In Al-Skeini some interpretations in Banković were outright 
redacted, where others were strengthened and elaborated. Al-Skeini amongst other things 
rectified the rejection of  personal types of  jurisdiction, and is therefore taken as point of  
departure for the second part of  the analysis. Included in both parts of  the analysis are 
other cases from the ECtHR where relevant and referred to by the Court in order to 
establish as sound a typology of  different jurisdictional bases as possible. 
Through the analysis of  the case law I will establish three main types of  jurisdiction 
pertinent to my enquiry: Effective control of  an Area (ECA), State agent authority (SAA) 
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  Milanovic, M (2012): Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, The European Journal of  9
International Law, Vol. 23 no. 1; Conte, A (2013) Human Rights Beyond Borders: A New Era in 
Human Rights Accountability for Transnational Counter-Terrorism Operations?, Journal of  Conflict & 
security Law, Vol. 18 no. 2: 233-258, Advance Access published on 3 May 2013
  European Court of  Human Rights, App. no. 52207/99, Decision on Admissability 10
hereinafter Banković
  European Court of  Human Rights, App. no. 55721/07, Judgment, hereinafter Al-Skeini11
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where public powers are exercised and SAA not fulfilling the public powers criterion.  12
Applying these three types of  jurisdiction to the application of  drones, I will finally discuss 
whether their application can possible trigger jurisdiction for the purpose of  Article 1. 
As a final introductory note, it should be emphasised that I do not provide a 
comprehensive legal analysis of  which frameworks of  International Law apply to the 
conduct of  drone strikes. The question raised here is confined to the extraterritorial 
application of  a specific regional body of  human rights law, and questions of  either 
concurrent applicability of  International Humanitarian Law or other Human Rights 
regimes (such as the ICCPR) is not taken into account.  13
3: THE ROLE OF THE EU IN SECURING A EU-
ROPEAN POSITION ON DRONES 
The area of  security, defence and foreign policy exhibits one of  the most 
intergovernmental part of  the European Union. The CFSP is exclusively conducted within 
the Council and the European Council, and with only a few exceptions all matters are 
decided by unanimity.  Article 31(2) of  the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states four 14
instances where qualified majority voting is used: when adopting strategic positions on the 
background of  positions already adopted in the European Council; when defining a 
European position on the face of  a proposal from the High Representative, following a 
direct request from the European Council; when adopting implementing measures of  an 
already adopted position; and when assigning a special representative on a certain area. 
Furthermore, the “European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that 
the Council shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to” above.  15
Neither of  these derogations from unanimity can be invoked when they concern issues of  
military and defence.  The resolution on drones adopted by the Parliament does then of  16
course not oblige the Member States nor the Council to adopt any particular position. It is, 
insofar as there have been no conferral of  powers from the member states and no 
supranational integration of  the CFSP to the Parliament, a political statement calling for 
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  Milanovic, supra note 9 at 122, points to two types of  jurisdiction; a personal and a territorial 12
concept of  jurisdiction. I generally follow this conception, but include in the personal 
category two different types of  jurisdiction.
  For a comprehensive study of  the full bodies of  international law applicable to the conduct 13
of  targeted killings see Melzer, supra note 2; See also Lubell, N (2010): Extraterritorial Use of  
Force Against Non-State Actors, OUP, ch. 10: Concurrent Applicability of  International Humanitarian 
Law and International Human Rights Law
  TEU, Chapter 2: Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy14
  TEU Article 31(3)15
  TEU Article 31(4)16
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action in general terms.  The Parliament’s opinion are only to be taken into consideration 17
by the High Representative, and the Parliament can refer questions and recommendations 
to the High Representative and Council. The Parliament thus have no conferred powers to 
oblige the Council to act or adopt a certain position.  18
Following from the intergovernmental nature of  the CFSP and the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) supporting it with military and defence policies, any possibility of  a 
common position on drones becomes more complex, and fraught with global political 
issues, rather than internal european deliberation. Historically, and even in the last couple 
of  decades, the Member States have not had a history of  agreeing on issues of  foreign 
policy and on certain areas of  defence, there have certainly been fault lines between major 
states. When a 'Coalition of  the Willing' surged to the Middle East to topple the Hussein 
regime of  Iraq in 2003, Europe was divided between partaking nations and states utterly 
opposed to the invasion on the merits of  its justification.  Coupled with the fact that most 19
of  the states of  the European Union were already members of  the NATO when the CDSP 
was formally negotiated, it is maybe not surprising that the foundation of  it is positively 
acknowledging Member States’ commitments to NATO, and in that regards relegates its 
own independent influence on security issues.  There are nonetheless implications and 20
obligations for Member States in the Treaty articles concerning the CFSP and CSDP; 
Member States are obliged to coordinate their policies in their external relations, and where 
there is an adopted EU position, the Member States are obliged to represent that position 
in their external relations.  There are nonetheless wide possibilities for states to derogate 21
from this obligation. TEU Article 31 sets out the possibility for states to abstain from a 
certain policy, which will free them of  the obligation to follow and represent the policy, as 
long as their actions are not in conflict with the adopted policy. 
The CSDP should not necessarily be relegated to a position of  non-influence or inaction. 
The list of  EU Missions is long, covering a grand total of  30, with the large part 
undertaken on the African continent. Those missions are based on the conflict-prevention 
and peace-keeping aims laid down in TEU Article 42(1) and 43, which also include the use 
of  CSDP mandates for combating terrorism outside of  the Union. The missions which the 
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  TEU Article 36.17
  Ibid.18
  Moravcsik, A (2003) : Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain, Foreign Affairs, Vol 82, No 4 (Jul-19
Aug 2003), p. 77; Møller, B (2005): The EU as a Security Actor - "Security by Being" and 
"Security by Doing", DIIS Report 2005:12, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies
  TEU art 42 (2 & 7) states that EU policies must be consistent with those of  NATO, and 20
recognises that NATO is the primary ensurer of  defence for those Member States which is a 
part of  it.
  See TEU Article 28(2), 32 and 3421
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EU have engaged in are not conflicts instigated as retaliatory, self-defence measures nor are 
they aimed at strengthening inner security by military build-up. If  anything, the missions 
secure inner security of  the region, by stabilising states which, without these missions could 
further destabilise and in turn harbour terrorist groups with the aim of  carrying out attacks 
against European states - Missions in Mali and Somalia would be cases in point. By and 
large the missions carried out in Africa does 'neither impact on the EU's security nor are 
primarily driven by security considerations.’  The task of  ensuring territorial security for 22
the bigger European states remain in the hands of  NATO, and the European states remain 
"net consumers" of  this security provided by its Atlantic partner, and it is hard not to note 
that this conception of  EU directly secured by the military might of  the US, through 
NATO, is reaffirmed currently when the crisis between Russia and the West breaks out 
over Eastern Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula.  It is noteworthy that, notwithstanding 23
its efforts to sanction the Russian actions, the EU have wholly left the job of  securing the 
European borders to NATO. Whether it is a difference in policy between EU and NATO 
does not negate the fact that there is no standing territorial defence policy under the 
auspices of  the EU, and that NATO and the OSCE have taken the brunt of  the 
responsibility for ensuring stability in Ukraine following the crisis, only contributing to the 
conception of  Europe as a “net consumer” of  security. If  drone technology is seen as a 
cost-effective development platform for increase EU military cooperation, taken together 
with the immediate military benefits of  drone technology, the development of  a European 
drone capability has not only economic, but also trans-atlantic salience. Development of  
drone technology within the EU provides an economically modest approach to complying 
with NATO wishes of  increased European defence spending.  And it is indeed seen as an 24
element of  future defence cooperation between European states, with the endorsement of  
a roadmap, by Defence Ministers in the European Defence Agency, for including 
“Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems” within the Common Staff  Requirement by 2020-25.  25
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  Møller, supra note 1922
  For the notion of  “net consumer” of  security, see Møller, supra note 19 at 12; See also for a 23
short overview of  the US position on increased NATO presence in Eastern Europe 
following the crisis over Ukraine, and Obama's critical comments of  European defence 
spending: Reuters (2014): Obama says NATO needs to boost presence in Eastern Europe, online 
news article, 26 march 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/26/us-usa-eu-
summit-nato-idUSBREA2P1XJ20140326 [Accessed 4 April 2014]
  Hatzigeorgopoulos, M (2012): European Perspectives on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, European 24
Security Review 63, ISIS-Europe
  European Defence Agency (2013) Defence Ministers Commit to Capability Programmes, https://25
www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/news/2013/11/19/defence-ministers-commit-to-capability-
programmes [Accessed 16 March 2014]
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WHAT IS THE POSSIBILITY OF EUROPEAN INFLUENCE ON 
SECURITY POLICY? 
Following these points of  the legal basis for EU security policy and their seemingly little 
influence on defence and security vis-a-vis their atlantic partners, what are the possibilities 
of  an EU position on the employment of  drone technology in conflict? Although the EU 
does not seem to be a provider of  its own security, notwithstanding any developments 
following the Ukraine crisis, its activities in international crises and conflicts are still 
present. The EUFOR mission to the Central African Republic, as an example, entails 
providing troops which engage directly in the provision of  security.  26
Following the above, it remains that the intergovernmental nature of  the CFSP affords less 
salience to the EP and its resolution on drones, than it does to the intergovernmental 
efforts to develop European drone capability.  Furthermore, the reluctance within the EU 27
to establish defence cooperation distinct from those provided by NATO, taken together 
with the intergovernmental arrangements of  its security policy, have led to an approach 
which furthers operations aimed at conflict prevention and security establishing missions in 
conflict zones, such as the current mission in the CAR. In this regard, drones have been 
seen to constitute a cost-effective measure which can be employed effectively in such 
situations, and the EDA strategy underlines that drones are indeed a future strategy for a 
common defence force, even if  it is currently on an intergovernmental stage. 
Concurrently, the trans-atlantic relation with the US as well as the critical voices raised by 
NATO of  the EU security framework, taken together with the internal economic and 
political situation of  the Union, strongly suggests that cost-effective measures to increase 
security capabilities are more likely than conventional military build-up. It is indeed readily 
apparent that there is outright objection to such a conventional standing force from 
countries such as the UK, whereas increased cooperation on the development of  drone 
technology aimed at assisting national militaries, as well as being used in EU led missions, 
seems to comply with both British objections to an “EU Army” as well as pressures to 
develop European security architecture from the US and NATO.  28
Taken at face value it thus seems that drone development is not constrained by the 
institutional setup of  the Union, but much rather relies on an intergovernmental situation 
of  bargaining, and where the relation with other security regimes provides a pressure on 
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  EEAS, supra note 8 on ongoing missions of  the EU.26
  See EDA, supra note 7 on European drone strategy.27
  The Telegraph (2013): David Cameron fights off  EU army plan, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/28
news/worldnews/europe/eu/10528852/David-Cameron-flies-to-Brussels-determined-to-
fight-EU-drones-programme.html [Accessed 22 May 2014]
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the CFSP. In conclusion then, there exist little constraints within the confines of  
institutional law of  the EU on the propensity towards drone operations - the contrary 
seems indeed to be the case. Furthermore, the recent EDA strategy on developing a 
European drone program, although intergovernmental in nature, seem to imply that drones 
will most likely become a part of  both national and thereby derived European military 
capacity. 
TEU Article 6(2-3) provides for EU accession to the ECHR and that the provisions in it 
"shall constitute general principles of  the Union's law." Consequently the adoption of  
policies under the CFSP (including missions) will be covered by the provisions of  the 
ECHR as well as rulings of  the ECtHR. The adoption of  foreign policies as well as the 
deployment of  EU missions in conflicts are then governed by the applicable provisions of  
the ECHR. So whereas there is no competence for the Council or European Council to 
introduce secondary legislation,  there is no lack of  competence for the Council to adopt a 29
common position on drones for its own defence policy as well as diplomatic relations, nor 
for it to ensure that Member States in their external policies act in conformity with those 
provisions of  EU law regulating their defence policy. It is the legal basis of  such a position 
that i engage with in the next part - namely that which concerns the allegedly special nature 
of  drone technology and its effect on ECHR jurisdiction. 
4: EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND 
DRONES 
Before moving on to the specific cases of  the ECtHR regarding the conditions under 
which to apply the Convention extraterritorially, I will shortly define which concepts are 
important to consider for this discussion. The basic premise for application of  the 
Convention is Article 1: 
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section 1 of  this Convention  30
It is thus the interpretation of  the term 'jurisdiction' which establishes the applicability of  
the Convention to both domestic and any extraterritorial situations. Different from the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the ECHR does not entail a 
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  i.e. introducing the proposed 'ban the development, production and use of  fully 29
autonomous weapons which enable strikes to be carried out without human intervention" in 
the EP resolution, supra note 5.
  "Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms", Rome, 4 30
Nov 1950
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specific territorial reference for establishing jurisdiction.  Although, even if  not mentioned 31
specifically, territory remains for the ECtHR the main source of  Convention jurisdiction 
for States and is used for reference through the cases covered here. 
As Lubell notes, jurisdiction generally refer to the competence to regulate (legislate) action 
and enforce compliance.  For states, jurisdiction then typically refer to the sovereign 32
competence for regulating and enforcing rules within their territory. This is the starting 
point in Banković on extraterritorial applicability of  the ECHR, and forms the reason for 
applying a restrictive view of  applying the Convention outside it’s geographical scope, i.e. 
the territory of  the Council of  Europe. !33
4.1: BANKOVIĆ 
The Banković case was brought to the Court by applicants asserting that a NATO air strike 
on a radio station in the Former Republic of  Yugoslavia (FRY), in which sixteen persons 
were killed - five of  the applicants relatives - and sixteen injured - the last applicant.  The 34
applicants contended that the strikes carried out by the States, by producing effects within 
the territory of  the FRY and for the relatives of  the applicants, "brought them and their 
deceased relatives within the jurisdiction of  those States."  It is by the effects brought onto 35
them by a conventional air strike that the applicants contends a jurisdictional link, which is 
based on the exercise of  authority and control over the individuals, is established. The 
applicants furthermore, as an alternate rationale, contended that, because of  the scale of  
the NATO operation, the States were in effective control of  the airspace in which they 
operated and as such they were obligated to ensure rights of  the Convention in that area, to 
the extent that they were affected by their actions: 
While it was a control limited in scope (airspace only), the Article 1 positive obligation could 
be similarly limited. [The applicants]  consider that the concepts of  "effective control" and 
"jurisdiction" must be flexible enough to take account of  the availability and use of  modern 
precision weapons which allow extra-territorial action of  great precision and impact without 
the need for ground troops. 
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  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, (ICCPR) - Article 31
2(1): "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present 
Covenant ..." (emphasis added)
  Lubell, supra note 13 at 20832
  For a different account and discussion of  the notion of  jurisdiction, and specifically a 33
critique of  the notion of  jurisdiction adhered to by the Court, see Milanovic, M (2008): From 
Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of  State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties, H.R.L. 
Rev. 2008, 8(3), 411-448
  Banković, §§ 4-13 on the circumstances of  the case.34
  Banković, § 3035
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Following this logic, the obligation to ensure the rights of  the Convention is linked to the 
extent to which a State controls an area of  operation. In Loizidou v. Turkey , where Turkish 36
troops occupied Northern Cyprus and in effect had seized government functions in that 
area, the ECtHR ruled that Turkey was obligated to ensure both the range of  positive and 
negative rights stemming from the Convention, whereas in the present case, the applicants 
contended, NATO countries party to the Convention, where obligated to ensure only 
those rights affected by their operations - inter alia the right to life.   37
These two points, the application of  extraterritorial jurisdiction by exercising authority over 
an individual (by force in this case) and the possibility of  dividing the rights of  the 
Convention according to the specific case, are the focus point of  the case. As we shall see 
both of  those views are interpreted restrictively by the Court. 
Exceptional Conditions for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
In its ruling, the Court asserted that "the jurisdictional competence of  a State is primarily 
territorial."  The jurisdiction of  the state in general is thus bound to its sovereign reign 38
over territory - and it is conversely restricted by other states' territory. Consequently any 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of  states are thus, according to the Court, exceptional: 
The Court is of  the view, therefore, that Article 1 of  the Convention must be considered to 
reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of  jurisdiction, other bases of  
jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances 
of  each case  39
Referring explicitly then to Loizidou, the Court establishes that one such exceptional base 
for jurisdiction may be established when a state is exercising effective control over an area of  
another state, "whether it [is] exercised directly, through the respondent State's armed 
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  ECtHR, Case of  Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Application No: 15318/89, 36
Judgment, Strasbourg 23 March 1995 - hereinafter Loizidou
  ECHR, Article 2: "1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be 37
deprived of  his life intentionally save in the execution of  a sentence of  a court following his 
conviction of  a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of  life shall 
not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of  this Article when it results from the use of  
force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of  any person from 
unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of  a person 
lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of  quelling a riot or 
insurrection."
  Banković, § 5938
  Banković, § 61; see also § 67: "In keeping with the essentially territorial notion of  jurisdiction, 39
the Court has accepted only in exceptional cases that acts of  the Contracting States 
performed, or producing effects, outside their territories can constitute an exercise of  
jurisdiction by them within the meaning of  Article 1 of  the Convention."
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forces, or through a subordinate local administration."  This was the case in Loizidou 40
where the sheer amount of  active Turkish troops on the ground in Northern Cyprus 
constituted effective control, and by derivation the actions by both local administration and 
Turkish forces came under the jurisdiction of  Turkey.  41
In sum, the case-law of  the Court demonstrates that its recognition of  the exercise of  extra-
territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State is exceptional: it has done so when the 
respondent State, through the effective control of  the relevant territory and its inhabitants 
abroad as a consequence of  military occupation or through the consent, invitation or 
acquiescence of  the Government of  that territory, exercises all or some of  the public powers 
normally to be exercised by that Government.  42
Simultaneously the Court establishes that other instances of  recognised extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, established by treaties and customary international law, include activities of  the 
states "diplomatic or consular agents abroad and on board craft and vessels registered in, or 
flying the flag of, that State."  43
In Banković, the Court concluded that the circumstances of  the case (a conventional air 
strike) could not fall under the exceptional circumstances triggering jurisdiction. The Court 
explicitly noted that the proposed logic of  the applicants, that the rights in the Convention 
should be "proportionate to the level of  control exercised in any given extraterritorial 
situation",  was contradictory to the notion of  effective control established by the case law 44
of  the Court. The Court established that the wording of  Article 1 does not invite the 
possibility of  the Convention to be "divided and tailored in accordance with the particular 
circumstances of  the extraterritorial act in question".  Consequently, if  jurisdiction is 45
triggered extraterritorially, according to the ruling in Banković - the full scale of  the 
Convention must be ensured, i.e. both positive and negative rights.  46
Espace Juridique and European public order 
Alongside the condition of  effective control established above, the Court also asserts in the 
judgment a certain notion of  the Convention's character as an essentially European 
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construct. The Court establishes that the Convention has a "special character of  the 
Convention as a constitutional instrument of  European public order for the protection of  
individual human beings and its role".  Once again referring to Loizidou, the Court 47
emphasises that the obligation of  the Turkish government to ensure that Convention rights 
was ensured in Northern Cyprus was in part because there would exist a rights vacuum had 
they not done so. But this vacuum was only existent by the fact that the area in question 
was already a part of  the area governed by the Convention, which was not the case in the 
FRY: 
... [The] Convention is a multilateral treaty operating, subject to Article 56 of  the Convention, 
in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of  the 
Contracting States. The FRY clearly does not fall within this legal space. The Convention was 
not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of  the conduct of  
Contracting States ... "  48
It follows from Banković that two specific conditions apply for the Convention to be 
applied extraterritorially by an Contracting State (notwithstanding the actions of  diplomatic 
agents acting in embassies etc. which constitute a distinct set of  criterias): 
1. That there is Effective Control of  an Area (ECA), constituted by the 
exercise of  "all or some of  the public powers normally to be 
exercised by [the Government of  that territory]"  - established 49
through, lawful or unlawful, military occupation or the consent or 
invitation from the Government. 
2. The area controlled, where action is taken, must be within the legal 
space (espace juridique) of  the Convention, i.e. on the sovereign 
territory of  a State party to the ECHR. 
Both restrictive interpretations in Banković are, if  not reversed then challenged, by 
subsequent case law of  the ECtHR. That is to say, the all-or-nothing approach to the 
obligations to ensure rights extraterritorially is redefined to accept a division of  the ECHR 
corresponding to the rights affected by the extraterritorial act. The notion of  legal space of  
the Convention as something exclusively pertaining to signatory states is similarly 
redefined. Nonetheless, the test of  ECA persists in the case law, and provides a tool to 
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understand jurisdiction under military occupation. Furthermore, as will be shown, the all-
or-nothing approach to both positive and negative rights persists in cases of  ECA 
jurisdiction. The definitive change is that the Court accepts two other types of  jurisdiction, 
which is not territorially based but relies on authority and control over individuals. 
4.2: AL-SKEINI 
The ruling of  the ECtHR in Banković have been criticised heavily for its apparent exclusive 
interpretation of  the jurisdiction of  the Convention.  Indeed the application of  the ECHR 50
in extraterritorial circumstances have certainly changed since Banković - and it has been 
applied also on territory not covered by the Convention's legal space. 
In general terms, Al-Skeini concerned whether the actions of  UK troops in Basrah, Iraq fell 
under the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction for the purpose of  Article 1 of  the ECHR, and 
then secondly whether there was a breach of  Article 2 on the right to life - specifically the 
derived obligation to instigate impartial investigations. For my present purpose I will focus 
on the question of  jurisdiction, which brings a new chapter, so to say, in the jurisprudence 
of  the Court regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
The specific circumstances of  the case included six applicants whose relatives were killed in 
the city of  Basrah, during the period where UK armed forces, as part of  a multinational 
force, was tasked to ensure security in the south east of  Iraq.  The main task of  the 51
military forces present in the region were to establish and maintain security, including 
efforts to “re-establish the Iraqi security forces, including the Iraqi police. Other tasks 
included patrols, arrests, anti-terrorist operations, policing of  civil demonstrations, 
protection of  essential utilities and infrastructure and protecting police stations.”  In the 52
words of  a report solicited by the UK Army Chief  of  General Staff, “the british Army was 
the sole agent of  law and order within its area of  operations.”  53
In a UK domestic case, five of  the cases were heard as test cases in a Divisional Court. 
That Court established that only the case of  Baha Mousa, who died in detention at a 
British Military Base, could be accepted, based on the detention centre as corollary to an 
embassy. The four other applicants, killed in and around the city of  Basrah during or 
subsequent to UK security operations, did not, according to the UK court fall within the 
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jurisdiction of  the UK.  The UK court relied on Banković and established that the 54
essentially territorial and European context of  the ECHR excluded the city of  Basrah from 
British jurisdiction - it was only accepted that a jurisdictional link could be established 
exceptionally in the case of  a British military prison in Iraq, which could fall under the 
exceptional circumstances pointed out in that case.  55
Considering the case-law of  the ECtHR when deciding on the appeals brought by the 
applicants, the UK Court of  Appeals gave a slightly different reading of  Banković. They 
included two types of  jurisdiction which could be established for the purpose of  Article 1: 
“State agent authority” (SAA) and, the already established “effective control of  an 
area” (ECA). SAA jurisdiction, it was held, is established when the State in question applies 
authority and control over an individual outside its own territory.  Although it introduced 56
a slightly different reading of  the term ‘jurisdiction’, also this court established that there 
was no jurisdiction over the first four applicants, as there were neither exercise of  effective 
control over the area nor authority and control over the individuals. The last applicant, 
though, was found to be under the SAA jurisdiction of  the UK from the time he was 
arrested.  When establishing whether the UK exercised ECA authority, it was emphasised 57
that the extent to which the UK forces exercised control over the area was so different 
from the conditions in Northern Cyprus under Loizidou, in that Turkey had deployed 
sufficient troops to ensure long-term occupation and control, whereas the UK were not 
providing “nearly enough troops and other resources to enable [the] brigade to exercise 
effective control of  Basrah City.”  58
The concept of  SAA jurisdiction then seem to conceptualise the exceptions made to the 
territorial conception of  jurisdiction established in Banković. The UK contention was 
furthermore that, when establishing the two types of  jurisdiction, the SAA is the only type 
of  jurisdiction which can be established outside Council of  Europe area.   59
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ECHR.
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Furthermore, the UK Government’s position was that Banković established that neither of  
the applicants, except the detained, could be said to be within the authority and control of  
the British forces when killed, even though they were shot at intentionally by British troops. 
The reason for this is found in the Court’s decision in Banković that the “Convention did 
not apply to military action of  the respondent States which resulted in those applicant’s 
relatives’ deaths. Equally, in the present case, the military action of  United Kingdom 
soldiers in shooting the applicants’ relatives whilst carrying out military security operations 
in Iraq did not constitute an exercise of  jurisdiction over them. No distinction could be 
drawn in this respect between a death resulting from a bombing and one resulting from a 
shooting in the course of  a ground operation.”  From the point of  view of  the UK, 60
authority and control are established only insofar as the individual is within the custody of  
the State so to say. In other words, a detained person falls within the jurisdiction, but a 
person who is killed, without being in the custody of  the State agents, does not. All in all, 
the UK Court’s and the UK Government’s position on the circumstances of  Al-Skeini 
seem to follow quite strictly the ruling in Banković. 
The Court’s Assessment of  Jurisdiction 
As intimated above, the Court’s decision on jurisdiction in Al-Skeini contradicts and goes 
directly against a few of  the most central points in Banković. The Court accepted the notion 
of  personal jurisdiction as entailed in the SAA approach of  the UK Divisional Court 
alongside the ECA type jurisdiction. When establishing the SAA, the Court went directly 
against Banković, when asserting the obligations triggered by such jurisdiction: 
It is clear that, whenever the State through its agents exercises control and authority over an 
individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to 
that individual the rights and freedoms under Section 1 of  the Convention that are relevant to 
the situation of  that individual. In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be “divided 
and tailored” (compare Banković, cited above, § 75).”  61
This mitigates some of  the problems rising from Banković, namely that there is not an 
impossible burden imposed on a State, to ensure the entire range of  rights of  the 
Convention, for persons under their authority and control. 
SAA jurisdiction is deemed to exist in situations where, “through the consent, invitation of  
acquiescence of  the Government of  that territory, it exercises all or some of  the public 
powers normally to be exercised by that Government (Banković, cited above, § 71). Thus 
where, in accordance with custom, treaty or other agreement, authorities of  the 
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Contracting State carry out executive or judicial functions on the territory of  another State, 
the Contracting State may be responsible for breaches of  the Convention thereby incurred, 
as long as the acts in question are attributable to it rather than to the territorial State.”  62
A second type of  SAA jurisdiction exists in ECtHR case law, namely that found to be 
exercised in Issa and Others v. Turkey and Öcalan v. Turkey.  Issa concerned a situation where, 63
during a Turkish military incursion into Northern Iraq, a group of  farmers were allegedly 
abducted by Turkish troops, taken to a cave and executed.  Öcalan concerned, for our 64
purpose, the jurisdiction triggered when Turkish agents took over custody of  an individual 
from Kenyan officials and brought him on an airplane. In both cases, the Court established 
that jurisdiction was triggered when a person was under the “physical power and control” 
of  State agents.  In both cases, what seems decisive was the custodial nature of  the physical 65
power exercised. 
The second important assertion by the Court in Al-Skeini was the relegation of  the espace 
juridique argument established in Banković. Al-Skeini reifies that the Convention is a 
“constitutional instrument of  European public order” and that it is not intended to be a 
means of  purporting human rights standards on third-party States.  But it then turns on 66
its head the restrictive interpretation of  that notion of  legal space: 
The Court has emphasised that, where the territory of  one Convention State is occupied by 
the armed forces of  another, the occupying state should in principle be held accountable 
under the Convention for breaches of  human rights within the occupied territory, because to 
hold otherwise would be to deprive the population of  that territory of  the rights and 
freedoms hitherto enjoyed and would result in a “vacuum” of  protection within the 
“Convention legal space” (see Loizidou (merits), cite above, §78; Banković, cited above, § 80). 
However, the importance of  establishing the occupying State’s jurisdiction in such cases does 
not imply, a contrario, that jurisdiction under Article 1 of  the Convention can never exist 
outside the territory covered by the Council of  Europe Member States. The Court has not in 
its case-law applied any such restriction (see amongst other examples Öcalan, Issa, Al-Saadoon 
and Mufdhi, Medvedyev, all cited above).  67
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This establishes the possibility of  applying the Convention outside its legal space,  and 68
removes the espace juridique criterion from the equation regarding jurisdiction. The Court 
does so, by at the same time reiterating the notion of  jurisdiction as set out in Banković, 
namely that it is essentially territorial, confined to the territory of  the state in question, and 
only apply extraterritorially in exceptional cases. In this sense, jurisdiction is still a “threshold 
criterion” , meaning that the exercise of  jurisdiction hinges on the extent to which the 69
State in question exercises effective control over an area or authority and control over an 
individual. This threshold criterion as paramount for discerning way in which the Court 
ruled in Al-Skeini. 
The two types of  jurisdiction established in the ruling then relates to two types of  
thresholds, that is to say, two different extents of  control. The territorial jurisdiction 
entailed in ECA is an all-or-nothing approach; if  there is overall ‘domination’ of  an area, it 
falls on the State occupying or enabling the administration of  that area, to ensure the entire 
range of  Convention rights. This is drawn directly from the Turkish/Cypriot case of  
Loizidou laid out above, and relates to cases of  military action, regardless of  whether it is 
lawful or unlawful. The assessment of  such effective control relies on factual situations, 
and as such “the Court will primarily have reference to the strength of  the State’s military 
presence in the are.   70
The SAA principle of  jurisdiction, on the other hand, constitutes an approach to 
jurisdiction where the obligations to ensure rights of  the Convention can be ‘divided and 
tailored’ according to the extent of  authority and control exercised.  That is to say, if  71
agents of  a Contracting State exercise authority and control over an individual by abducting 
that individual, the State is liable for the rights violated during the abduction, but not to 
ensure his right to, say, free elections.  72
Then, what is the type of  jurisdiction, if  any, established by the UK in Al-Skeini. The fact 
that the UK and the other Coalition Forces was an occupying power, under the provision 
of  the Hague Regulations, might imply that there exist ECA. But when the Court asserts 
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that effective control hinges not on the prospects nor on the motivation to establish such 
control, but on the factual control exercised it becomes a question of  fact to be determined 
on a case-by-case basis. It is pointed out numerous times in the ruling, the UK did not 
exercise any clear domination over the area; the situation in and around the city of  Basrah 
was wrought with civil unrest and constant combat operations.  Thus, even though the 73
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) could be established only by the presence of  
Coalition forces, the ability to exercise effective control was simply not possible, in part 
because of  the small amount of  troops present in the area.  But this does not mean that 74
the UK did not exercise jurisdiction in the area, it implies only that there was no factual 
basis for exercising effective control, and thereby triggering the obligation to ensure the full 
catalogue of  Convention rights. The Court did find jurisdiction triggered, but it was based 
on the SAA principle. 
The fact that the UK forces in South East Iraq was tasked with providing security and 
maintaining law and order instigated the SAA principle of  jurisdiction, because they 
exercised some public powers of  government. Because they were tasked with establishing 
security by patrolling, policing and engaging in anti-terrorist operations, a jurisdictional link 
for authority was then established. Because the death of  the applicants’ relatives happened 
during or “contiguous” to these security operations, the UK was asserted by the Court to 
exercise jurisdiction, and thus be responsible for ensuring those rights affected by the 
operations. Even the death of  the third applicants wife, whom it was unknown which side 
of  the conflict had struck there was a jurisdictional link to the UK.  These findings of  75
jurisdiction then enabled the Court to assess that there had been a breach of  the 
procedural obligation of  prompt and independent investigation, derived form Article 2 of  
the Convention, in the cases of  all but the sixth applicants’.  76
As laid out above, the ruling in Al-Skeini on jurisdiction hinges on the fact that it could be 
established that the UK exercised some form of  public powers (i.e. ensuring security and 
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stability) in the region.  Thus, the jurisdictional link is not established by the mere fact that 77
the applicants’ relatives were under the authority of  UK’s agents when fired upon, but 
because those actions were taken under the exercise of  public powers. Then, the ruling in 
Banković stands - the mere fact that NATO air forces carried out an air strike in Belgrade 
did not surpass the threshold of  authority and control.  
This might seem as a mix of  the personal and territorial models of  jurisdiction, as the 
fulfilment of  the public powers criterion triggers jurisdiction for all actions exercising those 
powers, within a given territory.  The ruling in Al-Skeini hinges not only on the exercise of  78
authority and control, but also an exercise of  public powers, but there is still a genuine 
difference between the SAA principle and ECA: The former bases the exercise of  authority 
and control over an individual on an exercise of  public powers brought on a State by its 
international agreement or through treaty or customary obligations, whereas the latter 
triggers jurisdiction based on de facto military domination of  an area and its institutions.  The 79
exercise of  SAA jurisdiction then relies on an interpretation of  ‘public powers’, which is 
not given an explicit definition by the Court. In Al-Skeini the public powers exercised was 
the obligation, as set out in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1483, to 
provide security and stability in Iraq.  Furthermore the Court underlined the temporary 80
nature of  the exercise of  governmental functions by the security forces in Iraq, as was set 
out in UNSC Resolution 1511.  The emphasis on the temporary nature of  the exercise of  81
public powers during the transitional period between the conclusion of  hostilities and the 
accession of  the sovereign Interim Government of  Iraq, seems then to underpin the 
exceptional nature of  the control exercised.  In Issa, time of  occupation or presence of  82
forces was also invoked, although supplementary, as a condition for the effective control 
jurisdiction to be triggered.  In that case, the Court stated that the presence of  Turkish 83
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troops in Northern Iraq did not appear to have effective control, even though the Turkish 
forces amounted to more than 35.000 troops operating in the area. Whereas the presence 
of  troops in Loizidou were so over a long period of  time and for the purpose of  staying 
there, the troop presence in Issa did not amount to the same type of  control because of  the 
temporary nature of  the operation. For the objective of  distinguishing ECA and SAA types 
of  jurisdiction this adds another dimension to that of  military domination. !84
4.3: Three Types of  Jurisdiction 
As is apparent from the case law of  the ECtHR as laid out above, three modalities of  
extraterritorial jurisdiction of  the ECHR exist for the purpose of  my enquiry:  85
1. Effective Control of  an Area, enabled by military dominance, 
regardless of  its legal states. 
2. SAA fulfilling the public powers criterion 
3. SAA without exercise of  public powers  
ECA 
ECA jurisdiction is triggered by the exercise of, through lawful or unlawful military action, 
effective control of  an area outside the State’s own territory. The principles of  this type of  
jurisdiction was set out in Loizidou and reiterated in both Banković and Al-Skeini (although 
without applying to those cases in question). Effective control is in essence a threshold 
criterion: it is through the military dominance of  a territory, so as to exclude the possibility of  
the territorial state to exercise jurisdiction, that extraterritorial jurisdiction is triggered. This 
was the case in Loizidou where Turkey exercised effective control over Northern Cyprus, 
and, through that effective control, the local government only existed and exercised its 
power of  government by virtue of  the Turkish presence. Furthermore, as pointed out in 
Issa, the exercise of  effective control were underlined by the long period of  military 
presence, including constant patrolling and control of  communication between Northern 
and Southern Cyprus.  86
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The obligations triggered by this type of  jurisdiction is complete: it is the obligation of  the 
State exercising effective control to provide to all citizens within that area, the full range of  
rights, negative and positive, as entailed in the ECHR. 
State Agent Authority and Public Powers 
The second type of  jurisdiction is triggered when a state, exercising some of  the public 
powers normally exercised by the territorial government, bring individuals under its 
authority and control. The obligations triggered by this mode of  jurisdiction is contingent 
on the rights affected - only those rights affected by security operations are under the 
responsibility of  the respondent State. Accordingly, when the right to life under Article 2 
was affected by security operations by UK forces under Al-Skeini, the obligations to 
investigate under Article 2 was equally affected, whereas the full range of  positive rights 
under the ECHR were not triggered. 
As discussed above, the criterion of  public powers is elusive and not as straightforward as 
the effective control criterion. The case-law of  the ECtHR does not give an exhaustive 
definition of  public powers, that is readily applicable. In Al-Skeini the public powers 
exercised by the UK was established formally, in numerous UNSC Resolutions as well as in 
communications from the CPA. As the UK was responsible for security operations in their 
territory of  operations, it was found that the rights of  the ECHR affected by these 
operations fell within the jurisdiction of  the UK. Specifically then, operations which fall 
under SAA jurisdiction, is contingent on two dimensions: the exercise of  public powers as 
well as the temporary nature of  that exercise. But the question remains whether SAA 
jurisdiction then hinges on a formal recognition of  those public powers, thus excluding the 
possibility to exercise jurisdiction as long as the acting State, for example, acts outside the 
public realm. The wording of  the principle in Al-Skeini would seem, at least for the ruling 
in that case, to actually support this interpretation - a State exercises extraterritorial 
jurisdiction when “through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of  the Government of  
that territory, it exercises all or some of  the public powers normally … exercised by that 
Government.”  And furthermore, this would be consistent with the interpretation of  the 87
personal jurisdiction laid out in Banković, namely that the mere killing of  an individual does 
not bring him or her within the jurisdiction of  a Contracting State.  88
It remains that if  is this formal recognition of  an exercise of  public powers is a condition 
for SAA jurisdiction to be established, then this would, as Milanovic points out, exclude 
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jurisdiction in situations where States act without formal adoption of  public powers.  This 89
would include operations where the territorial State is either unaware or non-accepting of  
any delegation of  powers to the acting State. As the ECtHR points out in relation to Issa, 
there do exist a possibility of  jurisdiction only triggered by the use of  force. Had it been 
established that Turkish troops had abducted the individuals in question and killed them in 
a cave, then they “would have been within Turkish jurisdiction by virtue of  the soldiers’ 
authority and control over them.” 
SAA Jurisdiction Without the Exercise of  Public Powers: Physical Power and 
Control 
The definition of  SAA jurisdiction laid out by the Court included the simple use of  force, 
as would have been the case in Issa, but the ruling in Al-Skeini conditioned SAA jurisdiction 
on the exercise of  public powers, which would be consistent with the ruling in Banković 
that mere control over airspace and the derived ability to kill individuals will not constitute 
jurisdiction.  For my present purpose, it is important to come to grips with whether the 90
ability to kill, in and by itself, can constitute the form of  authority and control envisaged by 
the Court for SAA jurisdiction. To that effect it is important to distinguish between the 
factual circumstances of  Banković and Issa insofar as they represent two seemingly 
contradictory interpretations.  In Al-Skeini, the Court emphasised in its definition of  SAA 91
jurisdiction, that “what is decisive in such cases [Öcalan and Issa] is the exercise of  physical 
power and control over the person in question.”  As Milanovic points out, the use of  a 92
drone strike (and a conventional air strike for that matter) is by all means an exercise of  
physical power.  But what is decisive for the Court is not only the exercise of  physical 93
power but “physical power and control over the person in question.”  94
For SAA jurisdiction to be triggered, without fulfilling the public powers criterion, there 
need to be an exercise of  physical power which brings the individual under the control of  
the State. The question of  whether an individual being killed by military of  a State, then 
hinges on an interpretation of  control. For Issa and Öcalan, the physical power and control 
exercised is through custody. The Court in Al-Skeini, when referring to the example of  Issa, 
state that SAA jurisdiction would have been triggered if  it could be established that the 
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Turkish forces had “taken the applicants’ relatives into custody in Northern Iraq” and then 
executed them. Equally, in Öcalan, the Court held that the applicant was under Turkish 
authority “directly after being handed over to the Turkish officials by the Kenyan 
officials.”  Thus, interpreting the control condition of  (this particular type of) SAA 95
jurisdiction would accommodate the seemingly contradictory interpretation in Banković and 
Issa, as pointed out by Milanovic, in favour of  the former, so that a mere power to kill does 
still not constitute jurisdiction, if  the person is outside the physical control of  the State. 
We thus end up with two types of  SAA jurisdiction - one that is based on the ruling in Al-
Skeini and one which is consistent with the principle of  jurisdiction defined in Issa and 
Öcalan. The former is conditioned on an exercise of  some or all of  the public powers of  
the territory, which, in the case of  Al-Skeini were codified in international and formal 
statements. The latter concerns situations where authority and control is exercised in 
situations where the public powers condition dose not apply, and then only concerns 
situations where the State agents exercise physical power and control over an individual, i.e. 
when the individual is in the custody of  the agents. !96
4.4: IS JURISDICTION TRIGGERED IN DRONE OPERATIONS? 
The question remains how and whether drone operations can trigger either of  the two 
types of  jurisdiction outlined above. 
Effective Control of  an Area 
Applying the conditions of  ECA jurisdiction to drones then involves establishing whether 
their application trigger the jurisdictional link - that is, do they establish effective control of  
its area of  operation. As was established in Banković, an aerial bombardment outside of  a 
State’s own territory could not in itself  trigger jurisdiction. An aerial bombardment is not 
much different from the use of  drones - but important distinctions do exist: a drone, such 
as the widely applied (by the US) Predator UAS is much slower than fighter jets, have the 
ability to hover over targets for extended periods of  time, it has extensive surveillance 
capabilities feeding live imagery of  targets to the operator, and then of  course the ability to 
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argues that the Al-Skeini judgment is silent on how Issa would have been judged, in that it 
does not leave room for SAA (personal in his words) jurisdiction without the exercise of  
public powers. I agree that the ruling on the specific circumstances of  Al-Skeini is 
conditioned on public powers, but discern a discrete possibility of  applying a custodial SAA 
jurisdiction which does not rely on the public powers criterion.
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fire the notorious Hellfire missile.  Weapons delivery then becomes more precise, in that 97
the operator can rely on live situational awareness by imagery, rather than relayed 
information from troops on the ground or intelligence that might be outdated. It is 
precisely these distinctions that Rosén focuses on, when he distinguishes the drone from 
other types of  targeting: 
The acts that produced Banković are simply hard to compare to situations where drones have 
been used for enduring close-up monitoring of  persons or territories. Compared to such 
situations, which drones typically are used for today, the airstrike on the Serbian Radio 
Television headquarters in Belgrade involved much weaker situation awareness and thus, it 
may be argued, less control.  98
Within the conditions of  ECA jurisdiction, it is still nonetheless hard to conceive that 
jurisdiction had been triggered, if  the situation had entailed a drone strike rather than an 
aerial bombardment as was the case. The test of  effective control applied in Loizidou 
includes an exercise of  some or all of  the public powers normally exercised by a sovereign 
government, as well as the inability of  the sovereign government to exercise those powers. 
As was further exacerbated in Issa and Al-Skeini, another condition of  ECA jurisdiction is a 
permanent or at least long-term control exercised by military presence. In Loizidou this was 
established through constant patrolling and checkpoints, and in Al-Skeini the temporary 
nature of  the public powers exercised was precisely one of  the reasons for not triggering 
ECA jurisdiction. Although the endurance of  modern drones is extensive, and it remains 
that they are used for long-term surveillance, arguing that solitary drone operations would 
by themselves trigger ECA jurisdiction is farfetched. Taking together with the 
circumstances of  Al-Skeini and Issa, which were not enough to trigger ECA jurisdiction, 
sole drone operations without troops on the ground, and for the purpose of  targeting 
single individuals or areas, would seem impossible of  meeting the (restrictive) threshold 
established in ECtHR case-law. 
A second point to be made concerning ECA jurisdiction is the consequences of  that type 
of  jurisdiction. It was established above that the ECA jurisdiction is an all-or-nothing type 
of  jurisdiction - that is, if  ECA jurisdiction is exercised, the State exercising jurisdiction is 
obliged to ensure the full range of  rights of  the ECHR.  If  a state exercises effective 99
control of  the local public powers of  an area, and in effect restricts the national 
government of  the territory from exercising those powers, then it falls on the 'occupying' 
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state to ensure those rights applicable in the situation. These rights would not only cover 
the provision of  public security, as covered by Article 5(1) of  the Convention, but also to 
ensure to persons within that area inter alia freedom of  expression (Article 10), right to fair 
travel (Article 6) right to privacy (Article 8), freedom of  belief  and religion (Article 9), right 
to marry (Article 12) and equality between spouses (Protocol no. 7, Article 5).  Under the 100
circumstances of  the case in Banković, in the case that effective control was established over 
the headquarters of  Serbian Radio Television, the applicants would be able to make a case 
against Belgium (and the other respondent states) in the case that they 'failed' to provide 
the necessary measures for ensuring not only security but also their right to marry one 
another(!). Insofar as those rights of  the Convention cannot be divided and tailored (at 
least not under the conditions set out in Banković), then it seems farfetched that the 
application of  a surveillance regime of  drones over a certain area would trigger the 
obligation of  the state for all those rights codified in the ECHR. 
While it is easy to agree with Rosén’s point that “there is a world of  a difference between 
the high altitude bombing of  Serbia, which produced the Banković case and long-drawn-out 
surveillance-intensive drone campaigns”, and that such applications of  drones “may 
involve a strong aspect of  control”, it simply hard to argue that the increased control meet 
the threshold of  effective control established by the case-law of  the ECtHR.  This is not 101
say that the use of  drones cannot be used to establish effective control. Long-term drone 
campaigns with significant presence and operations, such as those conducted by the US in 
North Waziristan, certainly comes closer to constituting situations of  effective control for 
the purposes of  ECA jurisdiction.  Drones most certainly contain capabilities which 102
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  Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 100
Strasbourg, 22.XI.1984
  Rosén, supra note 1 at 8-9; For the purpose of  clarity, note that Rosén in the paragraphs 101
following the quoted sentences refer to Al-Skeini when discussing effective control, and 
argues that if  there was a jurisdictional link established during those patrols conducted by 
the UK, then a drone operation would establish the same link. I can not but think that 
Rosén confuses the two types of  jurisdiction, as ECA was explicitly denied in Al-Skeini. 
Rosén seems to argue that jurisdiction established in Al-Skeini was so by recourse to the 
exercise of  effective control by the UK (at p. 9) - as I have laid out, ECA was not established, 
but SAA jurisdiction was by recourse to the exercise of  public powers by the UK.
  See International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic, Stanford Law School & 102
Global Justice Clinic, NYU School of  Law (2012): Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and 
Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan pp. 55-100, concerning the societal 
impacts of  US drone campaigns, adversely affecting the lives of  the population in the area. 
The report notes the effect on, inter alia, the propensity to aid victims of  drone strikes by 
fear of  “follow-up strikes”, as well as the adverse effects on living standards and economic 
sustainability of  the societies. This is not to say that there is a clear indication of  effective 
control, but that drone campaigns can certainly aid in establishing such control - but not in 
adverse different ways than conventional military operations, as those “kinds of  impacts 
described here are similar in numerous respects to those reported in conflict zones, or 
during periods of  considerable violence, around the world.” (p. 73)
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enable them to be used to establish effective control, but that is not to say that a single 
drone operation would trigger, in and by itself, ECA jurisdiction. 
SAA Jurisdiction 
As established in the above chapter on SAA jurisdiction, I discerned at least two types of  
SAA jurisdiction from the Al-Skeini judgment from the ECtHR. The first, which based the 
foundation for the ruling in the case, concerns situations where “through the consent, 
invitation or acquiescence of  the Government of  that territory, it exercises all or some of  
the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government … Thus where, in 
accordance with custom, treaty or other agreement, authorities of  the Contracting State 
carry out executive or judicial functions on the territory of  another State, the Contracting 
State may be responsible for breaches of  the Convention thereby incurred, as long as the 
acts in question are attributable to it rather than the territorial State.”  The second type of  103
SAA jurisdiction for our purpose here, is when a State, through its agents, have authority 
and control over an individual outside its own territory by exercising “physical power and 
control over the person in question.”  104
Concerning drones it is the second type of  criterion which seems most plausible. In cases 
where a territorial state knowingly lets the Contracting State exercise public powers on its 
territory, as is the case of  the first type of  SAA jurisdiction, there would be little difference, 
for the purposes of  ECHR rights, whether a drone or armed forces on the ground 
exercised the authority. As I laid out in the above, the public powers criterion hinges on a 
formal adoption of  those public powers, and there exist no possibility that a drone should, 
in and by itself, trigger such exercise.  105
On the face of  it, the possibility of  drones triggering SAA jurisdiction under the physical 
power and control criterion seems more likely. It is true that employing drones, in long-term 
surveillance operations with the ability to deliver lethal strikes almost instantly, is certainly 
an exercise of  physical power, and to an extent can also constitute a type of  control, as 
argued by Rosén.  But if  such control is exercised, it relies on the targeted individual 106
being aware of  the surveillance. The question then remains whether the control exercised 
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by drone surveillance can constitute the same type of  control as that exercised by having an 
individual in custody. 
What Constitutes Control over an Individual? 
My assertion here is that the control exercised by a drone and that exercised during custody 
by forces on the ground is distinguishable in at least two respects. The first relates to the 
ability of  controlling the action and movement of  the individual. The second relates to 
communication between the individual and the State agent for the purpose of  controlling 
those actions and movements. 
Controlling the actions of  an individual in the custody of  State agents, as envisaged in Issa 
and as was the case in Öcalan, is made possible by the close proximity of  the agents and 
their ability to exert physical power over those individuals so as to control their actions. 
This of  course includes detaining persons within a certain area, as well as moving them to 
another area, e.g. a prison or to the State’s own territory. This type of  control over actions 
and movements is certainly different from that which is possible by employing a drone. 
The possibility of  controlling the actions of  the individual is then enabled by the exercise 
of  physical power. But what, then, of  the physical power exercised by a drone strike? Even 
though it may constitute an exercise of  physical power, in that it have the power to kill an 
individual, it does not constitute the same type of  control as can be exerted by human 
agents. The reason for this is because the ability to communicate with the individual, so as 
to make it understood that a certain action is either demanded or unwanted (e.g. moving 
the individual to or keeping from a certain area), is non-existent during a drone operation. 
The physical power exercised during an abduction by military forces is simply not possible 
with a drone - and exercising the same control, i.e. moving the individual, is not possible by 
employing the technology embedded in drones either. In fact, the only possible way of  
‘communication’ with a Predator drone is engaging in a strike of  the area - which would 
hardly seem as a viable option in order for the individual to take a certain action. Held 
together with the circumstances of  Banković, the contention that drone operations should 
constitute such jurisdiction seems even less likely. Those possibilities of  control, i.e. the 
binary option to either kill or let live, does simply not differ sufficiently from the type of  
control exercised in Banković. This restrictive reading of  the case law has been criticised 
heavily, in that it opens a possibility for killing with impunity on foreign soil.  It 107
specifically sets apart situations where a State kills an individual on foreign soil from a 
distance and situations where the person have been arrested first. Nonetheless, a doctrinal 
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reading of  the case law, coupled with the fact that the ECtHR have insisted on interpreting 
extraterritoriality of  the Convention as strictly exceptional and mainly based on territory, 
shows that the ECtHR have interpreted Article 1 in precisely this manner.  For our 108
present purpose, whether the interpretation of  jurisdiction brought by the case law is 
correct is not too pertinent. It is true that if  killing from a distance would entail power and 
control over an individual, then a drone strike would trigger jurisdiction. But it is equally 
true that in such cases, the circumstances of  Banković - a conventional air strike - would 
have equally triggered jurisdiction over those affected. 
5: DOES THE EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER 
CONSTRAIN THE USE OF DRONES? 
In my analysis of  the CFSP and the EU law legal basis for defence and military 
cooperation, there existed little constraints on the use of  drones - the contrary was indeed 
the case. The EP Resolution on drones bears little weight in the purely intergovernmental 
area of  the CFSP and the strategy of  the European Defence Agency underlines the 
development of  a European drone capability, ready within the coming decades. Taken on 
the face of  it, the EP Resolution implies that the propensity towards employing drone 
technology is not constrained by the institutional and procedural provisions of  EU law 
governing the CFSP. The unanimity condition in the area of  security and military matters 
has the consequence of  leaving high security matters to the lowest common denominator, 
and furthermore giving way to the Member States own approach to foreign and security 
policy. 
The European Defence Agency strategy,  including the development of  a European 109
drone technology and -community, nonetheless underline that developments in security 
cooperation is ongoing, and that drone capability is on the rise. I furthermore showed that 
the development of  drone capacity under the auspices of  the EDA, conformed to both 
pressures from partners such as the NATO and the US as well as internal political 
differences on conventional military build-up. Concluding then, if  there should exist 
constraints on the use of  drone operations outside the EU, the legal basis should be found 
in the ECtHR case law. 
!30jmunkw@ruc.dk - EU-B1 - F2014
  This is underlined by the objection to the ‘territorial’ notion of  jurisdiction by Judge Bonello 108
in his concurring opinion following Al-Skeini. His critique is concurrent with that found in 
Lubell, Ibid., but nonetheless underlines that the state of  affairs, at least for the European 
Court, is that a restrictive interpretation is upheld.
  See EDA, supra note 7109
Constraints on Drone Operations in the European Legal Order
By systematically analysing the seminal case law on jurisdiction from the ECtHR, I analysed 
whether the ECHR could be used to constrain drone operations. I have above established 
those criteria and possibilities of  extraterritorial jurisdiction pertinent for establishing 
whether the application of  drones can trigger such jurisdiction. Let me reiterate that the 
question I have sought to answer regards whether drone technology, in and by itself, 
constitutes a trigger of  jurisdiction - that is, if  the ability to surveil over prolonged periods 
of  time and deliver strikes almost instantaneously trigger jurisdiction for the purpose of  
ECHR Article 1. The ECtHR has in its case-law taken a restrictive approach to the 
extraterritorial reach of  the ECHR, and one that seems even more restrictive than other 
human rights regimes.  110
As I laid out, three types of  extraterritorial jurisdiction exist in the case law of  the ECtHR, 
all of  them exceptional and justified by the circumstances in each particular case. Neither of  the three 
types of  jurisdiction laid out above, ECA, SAA with public powers nor SAA without public 
powers, can be triggered solely be the application of  a drone. Whereas effective control can 
certainly be envisaged to be established by using drone technology, the mere application of  
a drone in an area does not constitute such effective control. As noted in the above, under 
the circumstances of  Banković, applying a drone rather than a conventional air strike, even 
with prolonged surveillance leading up to the strike, would not have sufficiently reached the 
threshold of  ECA jurisdiction established in ECtHR case law. On the other hand, a 
prolonged period of  drone application, such as that in North Waziristan by the US, might 
contribute to establishing a situation that would go beyond the threshold, thus triggering 
extraterritorial ECA jurisdiction. However, this would not be triggered by drone 
technology, e.g. surveillance and strike capability, in itself  but by the factual situation, which 
would have to be tantamount to military occupation.  111
The second type of  jurisdiction as established by the ECtHR concerns situations of  State 
agent authority and control over an individual (SAA). SAA jurisdiction can be triggered 
either through the acts of  diplomatic or consular agents (not considered here); in situations 
where State agents exercise authority and control over individuals, while exercising some or 
all of  the public powers normally exercised by the territorial government; and in situations 
where the individual is in the custody of  State agents. The first mode of  SAA jurisdiction, 
based on the criteria of  public powers, was triggered in Al-Skeini by the fact that the UK 
had the formal responsibility for establishing security and stability in a part of  Iraq, and 
therefore exercised authority and control over individuals affected by the policies and 
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actions employed to exercise those powers, including during patrols, arrests and in 
detention facilities. As I established above, drone operations does not trigger such 
jurisdiction as it is contingent on the adoption of  a formal or customary role as supplying 
such public powers - through the “consent, invitation or acquiescence” of  the territorial 
government.  112
The last type of  jurisdiction relevant for my enquiry is SAA jurisdiction triggered when 
State agents exercise physical power and control over an individual, outside the State’s own 
territory. In the above I discussed the differences of  possible circumstances that exist 
between situations of  custody and that extent of  control and physical power exercised in a 
drone operation. Held together with the circumstances of  Banković, where it was 
established that a ‘mere’ power to kill extraterritorially does not in itself  trigger jurisdiction. 
By recourse to the type of  physical power exercised by a drone operation, and especially 
the limits of  the control exercised (i.e. the possibility to control movement and actions of  
an individual), I found that drone operations in and by themselves does not constitute 
physical power and control over individuals in accordance with that type of  custody 
envisaged in the Court’s interpretation of  Issa and Öcalan. 
Following these conclusions it can then be established that, following a doctrinal reading of  
the ECtHR case-law on jurisdiction, the application of  drone technology, does not in and 
by itself  trigger jurisdiction for the purpose of  ECHR Article 1. 
PERSPECTIVES: THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ECHR AND 
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES 
The conclusion drawn here is based on an unembellished reading of  ECtHR case law and 
undoubtedly leaves room for discussion. A specific critique of  the restrictive logic 
employed by the ECtHR, is that it excludes the applicability of  the ECHR in situations 
where a state, without the consent of  the territorial State, kills individuals in its territory. 
The control exercised in such cases is neither custodial nor triggered by the public powers 
criterion and therefore falls outside the purview of  the ECHR.  A concrete corollary of  113
this is that an abduction of  an individual on foreign territory, for example in order to bring 
the individual for domestic courts, establishes a jurisdictional link, but simply killing the 
individual with a drone strike does not! Whereas such situations inevitably violates 
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sovereignty and territorial integrity of  another state, it still excludes legal remedies under 
the ECHR for the individuals affected by the act.  114
This interpretation of  jurisdiction, seemingly inconsistent with the basic human right to 
life, is based on the Court’s insistence on Article 1 jurisdiction as primarily territorial, and as 
applicable to extraterritorial situations only in exceptional cases justified on their individual 
facts. Taken together with the objection to extraterritorial claims in Banković that the 
ECHR should be understood as an inherent European constitutional document, the 
restrictive interpretation apparent also in current case law seems more consistent. It shows 
the tension between international human rights regimes with a global reach, and its regional 
counterparts. Nonetheless, Al-Skeini seems to suggest that there indeed exists a tension in 
the Court’s interpretation of  jurisdiction itself. If  the objective for the Court was to 
consider the ECHR as strictly a European Convention, delegating issues of  human rights 
issues outside its borders to global conventions, such as the ICCPR, then the reversal of  
the espace juridique in Al-Skeini would not have been. 
Nonetheless, the Court’s persistence to rely on any extraterritorial jurisdiction as exceptional 
makes it imperative to grasp the case law on Article 1 in order to make any projections as 
to the future. As Milanovic states, persistence on exceptionality might imply that jurisdiction 
becomes subject to arbitrary decisions, and the difference laid out above between SAA 
jurisdiction with and without fulfilling the public powers criterion, seems to underline this 
point.  The fact remains that the extraterritorial reach of  other international human rights 115
Conventions have been interpreted more widely than is in the case of  the ECtHR.  Then, 116
the question remains, should there be consistency between the regional regime of  the 
ECHR and a global regime of  human rights such as the ICCPR? It is outside the scope of  
my paper to discuss, but the most recent case law of  the ECtHR suggests a convergence of  
the interpretation in the regional and global regimes, even if  not to the fullest extent. 
For the present purpose it is important to note that the conclusion drawn here, that drone 
operations does not by itself  trigger extraterritorial jurisdiction, is contingent on the 
present state of  the ECtHR case law. There should be ample reason to suggest that Article 
1 case law will develop, possibly loosening the grip of  SAA jurisdiction, so that not only 
situations of  custody is covered. Such a development would have consequences for the 
application of  drone technology, which can simply not be covered by the present 
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conditions. Concluding then, my analysis of  the European legal order suggests that there is 
not much constraining the use of  drone operations in extraterritorial situations.
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